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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
('~I'I'I•~D P.\ HK CITY :\liNER CO~I­
P.\~Y. a ('orporation, 
Pla i Htiff. 
- YS.-
THE IXDl'~TRlAL CO:\[MISSIOX 
nF l'T.\H & .JOHK \V. PRESCOTT, 
Defendants. 
Cmw Xo. 
10061 
BRIEF O·F PLAINTIFF 
XATFRE OF CASE 
Thi~ i~ an appeal frmn an order of the Industrial 
Conuni~~ion of Ftah granting defendant Prescott (here-
in rall(_-\d "PrP~eott'') cmnpensation for permanent total 
disability on tlw basis of injuries which, plaintiff con-
t\'lltb, an' properly cmnpensable as being only partially 
disabling under Section :~3-1-66, Utah Code Annotated 
l~)j~). 
Dl~PO~ITIOX BY IXDl~STR1AL CO~LJIISSIOX 
The Industrial Con1n1ission ordered payment of 
compensation for permanent total disability in accord-
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ance with the provisions of Section 35-1-67, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. 
RELIEF SOUGI-IT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks vacation of the aforesaid order of 
the Industrial Commission on the grounds ( 1) that the 
Commission acted arbitrarily and in excess of its powers 
in finding and concluding that the injuries sustained by 
defendant ,Prescott in his employment resulted in perma-
nent total disability, and (2) that the findings do not 
support the award under review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prescott was involved in a tragic mine accident on 
July 13, 1961. His injuries included fractures of right 
ribs and shoulder blade and right lung puncture. He 
complains of some residuals from these injuries, (sore-
ness of his right arm and a sensation of numbness in 
his right side ( R-62) ) , but there is no medical evidence 
of significant functional impairment or failure of these 
injured members to heal (R-5, 15, 23, 83, 88, 89; and 
refer to comments in Argument). 
The injury of real consequence (so far as disability 
evaluation is concerned) was a traumatic amputation 
of Prescott's left leg with associated avulsion of soft 
tissue in the inguinal area. Further surgical amputation 
and debridement have left little soft tissue with which a 
prosthetic device can make contact (R-20), and Pres-
cott has very limited ambulation with an artificial leg. 
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PrPscott was referred to a Th[edical Advisory Board 
appointed by the Conunission for evaluation of the disa-
bility from his work-related injuries. The Board found 
PrP:o;eott to have sustained a 90o/o loss of ''bodily func-
tion" n~ that tenn is employed in the next to concluding 
parngrnph of Section 35-1-66, U.C.A. 1953, the section 
1·elatin~ to per1nanent partial disability (R-15). 
Prl'scott does not contest or disagree with the 90% 
rating of the :Medical Advisory Board. He merely con-
h•wb that a 90(;~ •·loss of bodily function'' is tantamount 
to total disability ( R-52, 54). 
Finally, Prescott is more than sixty-six years of age 
( H-j~) and of lower average mentality (R-23, 83). Be-
cause of his age, mentality and limited ambulation, he 
cannot compete for employn1ent (R-82). He has made 
n good psychological and enwtional adjustinent to his 
injury ( R-23, 8-t). 
ARGU1\1ENT 
POINT I 
THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF FUNCTION IN 
THIS CASE IS THE LOSS ATTENDANT UPON LEG 
AMPUTATION, AND THE RULE THAT PERMA-
NENT TOTAL DISABILITY MAY BE PRE1SUMED 
FROM INABILITY TO RESUME PRE-INJURY TYPE 
OF WORK DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE LOSS 
SPSTAINED IS ONE OF THOSE IN THE STATU-
TORY SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC AWARDS. 
'y e would not attempt to nrinimize the functional 
lo::'s Prescott sustained by reason of the amputation of 
his leg. The trauma and subsequent surgical procedures 
have clearly left Prescott in essentially the position of 
an amputee whose shm1p is not sufficient to permit 
the use of an artificial leg. This 'vas his testimony, and 
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the rating g1ven hiln by the ::\[edical Advisory Board 
entitles hin1 to exactly what the statute provides for 
mnputation at the hip. 
The error we see in the Com1nission's position is 
that it has found permanent total disability on this loss 
of function coupled only with the fact that Prescott is 
too old, in view of his lower average Inentality, to be 
employable. vV e sub1nit that such a finding constitutes 
an administrative construction of the statute which is 
in direct conflict with the construction given it hy this 
Court. 
We must agree that this Court, by its decisions 
beginning with Caillet v. Industrial Cornmission (90 
Utah 8, June 18, 1936) and concluding with Thomas v. 
Commission (95 Utah 32, 1\fay 11, 1938), evolved a rule 
of law that permanent total disability is established, in 
a proper case, by a showing that the injured worlanan 
cannot perform work of the kind he was performing 
when injured or any other work which a man of his 
n1entality or attainments might do. The first problem 
is to determine what is a proper case. 
The decision which best states the philosophy of 
the Court as it applies to the instant case is Babick v. 
Industrial Commission (91 Utah 581, 65 P.2d 1133). 
Justice Wolfe there reconsidered the language of the 
Caillet decision (which announced the general principle 
of law to which we have referred) and refined the 
judicial statement by this commentary: 
"In the Caillet Case, the applicant had one 
hand off and two fingers of the other hand ampu-
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tatl•d almost to the wrist, which gave him 100 per 
<·~~nt los~ of function of one hand and 60 per cent 
ol' the othPr. liP had a 20 per C(:lnt loss of knee 
ad ion. The evidence showed that his ability to 
do any work substantially renu1nerative was so 
twgligible as to approach the vanishing point. 
j[oreover, the opportunity to secure the very few 
typp::; of work he could do was nil. Perhaps the 
language from that case above quoted is a little 
too inclusive. It would fit the person who had 
one leg or an arm off. A workman who had 
done manual labor who lost an arm or leg could 
not 'perform the work of the general character 
that he was performing when injured,' and yet 
under a strict following of this rule he would 
Pstablb;h a prima facie case. In the first place, 
the rule was not Ineant to operate in any case 
where specific compensation for a loss of a mem-
hPr or loss of function of a men1ber was provided 
by statute for permanent partial disability." 
The Commission·~ detern1ination that this is a 
}H'O}ll'r ease for the application of the Caillet doctrine 
i:5 the first error we would cite. Prescott's injury-related 
disability is essentially that which attends the loss of 
a leg. X o one who has evaluated this disability has 
attacl1ed any ilnportance to the residuals from the frac-
turPs and lung lesion. \Ye believe the following is a 
fully l'l'VPaling sununary of the medical evidence with 
reference to the final disabling result of the injuries 
to the upper torso: 
1. As early as July 26, 1961, (less than two 
weeks after the injury) Dr. Boyd Holbrook, 
an orthopaedic specialist, examined Prescott 
and reported his findings in a letter dated 
August :2,1962 (R-p.5). The gist of there-
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port is that there should be no significant 
disability fr01n the fractures, there being no 
neurological or circulatory i1npairment to the 
injury sites. We believe one paragraph of the 
report can be quoted as fairly summarizing 
the medical opinion : 
"This type of InJury ordinarily heals 
with little if any disability. In view of the 
1nany injuries he has sustained, I would ad-
vise continued conservative treatment in this 
area, and would not reconnnend operative 
repair. If his symptoms persist in this area 
after sufficient time for healing, the inner 
one inch of the clavicle can be excised." 
There is nowhere in this record any indication 
that Prescott thereafter consulted Dr. Hol-
brook or any other physician with reference 
to "continued symptoms in this area" or that 
such symptoms could not be relieved in the 
manner Dr. Holbrook suggests if they per-
sisted. 
2. The l\{edical Advisory Board evaluated Pres-
cott's permanent disability on August 25, 
19·62. The Board found (R-15) that the multi-
ple injuries resulted in a "90% loss of bodily 
function." Significantly, the compensation 
payable for this percentage loss of function 
is exactly the same as that payable for ampu-
tation of a leg where prosthesis is not feasible. 
It is obvious that the Board (while making 
its rating inclusive of all injuries as it must) 
considered the upper torso problem to be de 
minimis and the only consequential disability 
to be that related to the amputation, a kind of 
loss for which the statutory schedule specifi-
cally provides. 
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3. Dr. Hoy A. Dark~, after an examination of 
Prt-~<'ott on January ~2, 1963, reported (R-23) 
that Prt>~('ott "could likely do well with any 
manual training that did not require fine pre-
ei~P movmnents." He suggests no impairment 
of tnanual dexterity from injury. 
-t Presrott wa~ evaluated by the Division of 
,~ ocational Rehibilitation of the State Depart-
ment of Public Instruction, and a report was 
made hy l\[r. Paul T. Furlong (R-29, 30) who 
al~o testified (R-72 through 83). ~fr. Fur-
long's opinion of unemployability is based 
unequivocally on these factors : 
a. Age. 
h. Loss of effective ambulation. 
c. Past job history and education. 
d. ~[entality. 
This "-a~ his concluding testilnony as Pres-
cott's witness (R-83), and not a word was 
elicited fron1 him on redirect as to his at-
tachment of any importance to the injuries of 
the upper torso. 
:l. Pursuant to a Connnission order made during 
tlw course of the hearing in this matter, Pres-
cott was exan1ined by Dr. L. E. Viko, an in-
ternist. for evaluation of heart and lung path-
ology. In a two page report (R-88, 89), Dr. 
Yiko said he "found, then, no specific lung 
pathology.'' ··He (Prescott) does have myo-
cardial changes presumably on an arterio-
sclerotic basis." Arteriosclerosis is not, of 
course. an incident of trauma. Dr. Viko fur-
ther found the "lungs and abdomen were neg-
ativt>" for pathology except for diminished 
heart sounds, and the "lungs were surprisingly 
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negative for a 1nan who had been 33 yPars at 
1nining work." 
On the whole record, therefon~, it n1ust be concedPd 
that the fractures and lung lesion, however strongly tlwy 
n1ay have contributed to the general discomfort and 
the management problem, are not significant in the 
final evaluation of disability. \V e are evaluating a man 
who, because of injury, has lost a leg and cannot use 
an artificial one. This is a kind of loss for which the 
statutory schedule specifically provides. Except for 
that, the factors which make him unemployable (his 
advanced age, his inability to learn, his limited work 
experience) are entirely unrelated to his injury. 
1rV e submit that this is not a proper case for appli-
cation of the Caillet doctrine. That doctrine has only 
been applied where there have been two or n1ore anato-
mical members or vital systems substantially impaired. 
The decisions in point and the n1e1nbers or systems 
involved are these : 
Caillet v. Commission (supra) - Amputa-
tion of one hand - 60% loss of function of the 
other hand - 20% loss of knee action. 
Standard Coal Co. v. Commission (91 Utah 
549; 65 P.2d 640) - Loss of use equivalent to 
amputation of one leg - disabling circulatory 
disturbance of other leg ( fron1 which bone \ras 
taken) presuinably injury related-injury-related 
obesity. 
Carbon Fuel Co. v. Commission (92 Utah 
410; 68 P.2d 894) -Drop foot- lordosis, right 
hip irreparably out of socket - left femur frac-
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tnrPd at w·<·k - both hips unstabh·- inch separ-
ation of symphysis pubis. 
Thomas v. Commissiou (supra) - Loss of 
usP of mw lPg - phh•bitis causing 3W/r loss of 
other leg and~ n·qniring PXtPn~ive bed care frmn 
time to thne. 
To apply the ( iaillet doctrine in a case where the 
onlv ~i,,.nil'i<·ant disahilitv results frmn a loss of func-
. ~ . 
tion <'OYl'l'<'<l hy a ~pPei fie statutory provision is a mani-
fest dPparture frmn the rule of the Babick case. It 
would creatP a clhnate in which the first objective of 
any J>Prmanently injured worlnnan would be to demon-
~tratP his inability to learn or be rehabilitated. 
POINT II 
90% LOSS OF FUNCTION UNDER SECTION 35-1-66, 
l'.C.A. 1953, IS NOT TANTAMOUNT TO TOTAL 
DISABILITY. 
\\'p would emphasize, at the outset, that Prescott 
has conceded the a<'<'Uracy of the :Medical Advisory Board 
disability rating (R-15) which was "90% loss of bodily 
function." Counsel so stated at page 52 and again at 
page 5-J.. of the Record. Prescott's only contention is 
that ~lO~c loss of function is so close to total loss that 
it should be considered the equivalent. If the term 
"bodily function,'' as it is used in Section 35-1-66, l:.C.A., 
nwant ''total of bodily functions," we would concede 
that Prescott's position in this case is unassailable. A 
person who has only 10% of his life processes in function 
is helpless and totally disabled by any standard. The 
term cannot rationally be assigned such a n1eaning, how-
ever. and this Court has expressed itself on the point. 
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In the first place, the phrase "loss of bodily func-
tion" appears only in the section on pennanent partial 
disabiltiy (35-1-66), and that section contemplates that, 
in the event there is a total loss of a bodily function not 
specifically provided for, the limit of compensation 
should be 200 weeks. The paragraph in which the 
term appears is this : 
"For any other disfigurement or the loss of 
bodily function not otherwise provided for herein, 
such period of compensation as the commission 
shall deem equitable and in proportion as near 
as may be to compensation for specific loss a~ 
set forth in the schedule in this section but not 
exceeding in any case two hundred weeks." 
When the 1Iedical Advisory Board 1nakes a rating in 
tenns of "loss of bodily function," then, it is orienting to 
the only section of the \V orkmen's Compensation Act 
which employs that tenn and equating the loss it finds 
with the specific losses set forth in the schedule pre-
ceding the quoted paragraph. \Vhat the l\1edical Ad-
visory Board found in fact was that the loss of function 
Prescott sustained from his injuries was 90% as dis-
abling as the loss of an arn1 at the shoulder. It did 
not find that Prescott's disability was 90% of penna-
nent total disability. Prescott admits that this ratinr; 
ts accurate. 
\Ye have previously herein said that this Court has 
alt·ead~, construed 35-1-6G as "'e contend it must be 
construed. In Babick v. Cmnmission (supra), a clear 
distinction "'as dra\vn between two "zones'' of disability. 
Disabilities to be appraised in tenns of permanent total 
10 
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disability under ~P<'tion :~5-1-67 are in one zone; those 
to hP appraised in h•rms of pennanent partial disability 
undt·r ~w<"tion 35-1-66 are in another. We would refer 
tht> Court to thP discussion at 91 rtah 585. In this case, 
the Commission (R-16), Prescott (R-54, 56) and the 
plaintiff all acknowledge that Prescott's disability falls 
within the latter zone. Everybody recognizes that Pres-
cott is not totally disabled front his injuries. 
l f we labor this point, we do so to illuminate the 
t'Pntral issuP in this case: It is proper to award perma-
nent total disability cornpensation to a worlunan, whose 
permanent disability is admittedly rated properly at 
90j~ of the loss of an arn1, because he had reached, at 
tht> time of his injury, an age where one of his mentality 
c.·annot compete successfully in the labor n1arket ~ 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED, AS 
THE TEST OF TOTAL DISABILITY, THE DOC-
TRINE OF THE CAILLET CASE, AND THAT DOC-
TRINE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY MODIFIED. 
Then' is little question about the basis upon which 
the Conunission decided this case. Commissioner Wies-
lt>y, during the course of the hearing, accurately stated 
the doctrine of Caillct v. Commission (supra) and fur-
ther expressed his belief that it constituted the law of 
the case. ~-\ t the bottom of page 77 of the Record, we 
find this: 
"THE REFEREE: The last decision of the 
Supreme Court that I can recall, written by 
Justice Moffat, says that the test of total perma-
nent disability is can the man do the same kind 
11 
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of work he did before, or Ly reasonable l•ffort 
prepare hilnself for si1nilar work. But whether 
that will stand up, ~Ir. Allen, or not, I don't 
know. But that's the last word that I know. ~o 
I think he may answer." 
In the order itself (R--104, 105), only one Vtah case is 
cited, and that case is Caillet v. Comndssion. 
As we have previously pointed out, the Caillet doe-
trine has been substantially Inodified. Even in a proper 
case (which we have already argued this is not) the 
test is not \Yhether the en1ployee can return to the same 
or similar employ1nent, but whether he can function 
in an economic activity which one of his mentality and 
attainments can perfonn. \V e quote the following from 
Justice vVolfe's dissenting opinion in the Thomas case 
(supra): 
"The language of Caillet v. Industrial Comm., 
90 Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760, quoted by the prevailing 
opinion, was so broad as to take in cases of the 
loss of a hand. In such case an employeP might 
show that he was unable without a hand to do 
work of the general character he had been doing, 
and this made out a prima facie case. And if the 
other side could not show that he could secure 
and perform work of a special nature, he would 
be as a Inatter of law, under that rule, perma-
nently and totally disabled. The rule was too nar-
row and too wide. It was too narrow in that 
it made the pri1na facie test in law of permanent 
and total disability purely the question of whether 
he could perfonu work of the general character 
that he had been performing when injured. It 
did not add the phrase 'or anY other work which 
a man of his n1entalit .. / or att~inments might do.' 
It "yas too wide in that it brought in the eco-
12 
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nomic situation as a factor in overcmning the 
prima facie case. It n1ight be impossible in a 
deprP~sion to obtain work of a special nature or 
anv kind of work for a fully able man, whilst 
in ·war tinws, wht•n every available man is utiliz-
ahlP, any nmnber of cripples could obtain jobs. 
'fhis would n1ean that the prilna facie case would 
lw met successfully only accordingly to the vary-
in~ economic situations. The statute never con-
templated such a thing." 
In the instant case, tlwre is c01npetent evidence 
hy a nwdi(•al PXpert, Dr. Darke (R-23), that Prescott 
"would likely do well with manual training that did not 
requi rP finP, preci:sP 1nove1nents or attention to fine 
complicated details." The inescapable conclusion to be 
drawn from the Record is that the Commission never 
considered this evidence as having relevance because of 
it~ conviction that the "test" is ability to return to the 
~amt' or similar employinent. 
The Record clearly establishes that Prescott is 
limited, physically, to sedentary occupation. This would 
be true by reason of his arteriosclerosis (R-88, 89) even 
if he had not lost a leg, and the sclerosis is not work-
related. \Yithin that limitation, he is capable of carrying 
on any activity which an uneducated man of lower aver-
ag"t• mentality can do. All that :Mr. Furlong added to 
our understanding of Prescott's situation is that there 
aren't any jobs for 66 year old, uneducated, untrained 
Inen who have little n1obility and lower average men-
tality. It is also true that there aren't any jobs for 
:'Uch men who do have n1obility (R-80, 81). If e1nployers 
ha'fe a choice, they will hire a man who is young, 
13 
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trained, intelligent and 1nobile over one who has nonp 
of these virtues. Therefore, says :Mr. Furlong, Prescott 
could not find a job for which there was "competition" 
(R-81). :J[r. Furlong nowhere says, however, that Pn~~­
cott could not perforrn if he were given such a job. By 
l\Ir. Furlong's standards, a man becon1es permanently 
and totally disabled when he reaches sixty-five unless 
he can de1nonstrate a skill, a talent or a mental facility 
which will overcome prospectivP en1ployers' natural 
preference for younger men. 
vVe sub1nit that 1nost of the factors to which Mr. 
Furlong gives weight (Prescott's age, 1nentality, lack 
of education or training and his wife's arthritis ( R-29, 
30)) have no relation to his injury. To predicate em-
ployer liability to pay benefits for total disability upon 
those factors violates a basic principle of compensation 
law which is, as stated by the editors of Corpus Juris 
Secundum (99 C.J.S. 1067), that ''in order to warrant 
compensation for total disability, the inability to work 
1nust be due to the injury." 
POINT IV 
THIS IS NOT A CASE WHERE A FINDING OF 
COMMISSION IS UNDER A'TTACK. THE ISSUE ON 
WHLOH REVIEW IS SOUGHT IS PURELY AN 
ISSUE OF LAW. 
\r e are aware of the Court's strong reluctance to 
disturb a fiudiug of fact 1nade by the Industrial Com-
Inission, and the Court's justified belief that it can 
relY on the Con11nission's expertise in evaluating the 
evidence and the credibility of witnesses. \Ye yield to 
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none in our respect for the Couunission's cmnpetence 
and the soundness of its judgn1ent in this regard. The 
facts an• not in dispute in this case, however. The 
Commission found and everyone agrees that the disa-
bility from injury is essentially the smne as the loss 
nl' a lPg at the hip. Everyone agrees and the Com-
mi~~ion presumably found that Prescott, because of 
factors of age, mentality, training and education, is 
not likely to win in competition for jobs. \Vhether or 
not this kind of unemployability an1ounts to pennanent 
total disability within the meaning of the Compensa-
tion Aet~ is a pure question of law. We concur in the 
findings of fact; we believe the Comn1ission's conclusion 
of law cannot properly be drawn frmn those facts. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
CLYDE, MECHAl\I & PRAT·T 
By FRANK: J. ALLEN 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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